Homo Homini Lupus: Is that the right way to approach Economic Security?

 

The discipline of International Relations, particularly in the Realist tradition, seems to be woven around the notion of Homo Homini Lupus. (Hu)Man is Wolf to (Hu) Man. But is this notion correct? Or is it just a problem of perception? Realists tell us that it is either human nature or the structure of the international system that makes conflict a recurring theme in our epic. But the constructivists would like us to believe that reality is what we perceive it to be (“Anarchy is what we make of it”). This debate has been around for a long time. An even more interesting sector of this debate is economic security.

So, what is economic security? – Economic security can be defined as the ability of a nation to secure its economy from external or internal threats. External threats include sanctions, wars, embargos, blockades etc. Internal threats can constitute populism, physical threats to the movement of goods, services and people within the country etc.  It can also be said to be the ability of a state, a bloc or even an international organization (IO) to provide prosperity and relative economic equality to its members or citizens.

An essential question to ask here is this: If security must be provided by the state, then it must be threatened by another force. So, does this external or internal force exist in reality or is it a result of mere perception? – This question is nothing but another way of articulating the realist vs constructivist debate elucidated in the first paragraph.

Countries pay great attention to their trade balance, debt to GDP ratio, ease of doing business rankings and other key indicators because it is thought that these indicators reflect not just the state of the economy but also the ability of the government to secure livelihoods.

The second point is important when we think of security studies and the basis on which the notion of economic security is constituted. As the provider of livelihoods, the logical next step for the state is to remove impediments on its ability to do so. Thus, begins the process of securitization.

This process, does indeed have a strong Realist scent to it. In addition to that, it is also difficult to fit this process into a certain box. For instance, Robert Cox attempted to make an important distinction when it comes to IR theories. He said that there were two kinds of theories: problem-solving and critical theories. The problem-solving theories, he said, were interested in identifying small issues within the existing system and attempting to solve them while ignoring structural problems. On the other hand, critical theories question the foundational assumptions of the existing system.[i] Our topic of discussion somewhat transcends this division as the Realist process of securitizing the economy neither solves a problem nor does it attempt to question anything. All that it does is that it makes the economy a protected object and identifies key threats to the protected object. One cannot put this process into a clean-cut analytical box.

 An interesting example to examine this paradigm is the example of trade wars and particularly the recent one going on between the US and China. The Trump Administration’s reason for imposing tariffs on Chinese goods was ‘national security.’ The Administration felt that large trade deficits with China constituted a threat to national security[ii] because this constituted an outflow of money and jobs from the United States. Money (being key to the US’s commercial interests) and jobs (for economic and political interests) are important elements of economic security.

The Trump administration is solving a problem, as well as looking critically at a certain structural issue (the global trade structure over here). This puts securitization beyond Cox’s analytical framework. However, it does not answer the moot question: is the threat something that is perceived or something that is real? To answer that, we must distinguish between security issues and normal political issues[iii]. The securitized realm is where urgent action is necessary because the problem has created a state of emergency. The normal political realm, on the other, is where the issue has been ‘de-intensified.’ This distinction creates an element of human agency in the conversation. It partly bends towards the constructionist angle, because it shows that a certain issue can indeed be ‘de-intensified.’ But it still does not attempt to question the role of the state. If the state continues to be the protector, then is it the case that its assumptions about what constitutes a security threat and what doesn’t will continue to drive our outlook?

In that case, does China become a threat to America’s economic security because the Trump Administration chose to interpret economic data in a certain way? Perhaps. Is that a good thing?... The answer to that is difficult. As Waever says in his assertions, playing a game with the powerful also puts us in a situation where we are subjected to randomly changing environments and rules[iv]. It is they who create the threat perception. Yet, accepting the reality that governments are the actors who often have the authority to classify something or someone as a security threat does not mean that the governments are inherently wrong. Often, the perception of the state of economic security depends on which party is in power and who has voted for them. The rightness of actions depends on whom we ask.

To conclude, Homo Homini Lupus is not just an exotic Latin saying. But it is also the basis on which securitization takes place. A state can only securitize itself if it accepts that another entity is intent and capable of damaging its interests. Whether that is right or not is relative. That is the beauty of the relativity of security studies.

References:

Huang, Yukon. “The U.S.-China Trade War Has Become a Cold War.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Accessed February 4, 2022. https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/09/16/u.s.-china-trade-war-has-become-cold-war-pub-85352.

Krause, Keith, and Michael Williams. “Security and ‘Security Studies.’” The Oxford Handbook of International Security, 2018, 13–28. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198777854.013.2.

Schouten, Peer. “Theory Talk #37: Robert Cox.” Theory Talk #37: Robert Cox. Accessed February 4, 2022. http://www.theory-talks.org/2010/03/theory-talk-37.html.

Waever, Ole. “ Securitization and Desecuritization.” On Security, n.d.

 

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[i] Schouten, Peer. “Theory Talk #37: Robert Cox.” Theory Talk #37: Robert Cox. Accessed February 4, 2022. http://www.theory-talks.org/2010/03/theory-talk-37.html.

 

[ii] Huang, Yukon. “The U.S.-China Trade War Has Become a Cold War.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Accessed February 4, 2022. https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/09/16/u.s.-china-trade-war-has-become-cold-war-pub-85352.

 

[iii]Krause, Keith, and Michael Williams. “Security and ‘Security Studies.’” The Oxford Handbook of International Security, 2018, 13–28. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198777854.013.2.

[iv] Waever, Ole. “ Securitization and Desecuritization.” On Security, n.d.