Sea-curitization: The South China Sea Dispute

Maritime security is an extremely important aspect for a littoral state, given the enormous implications, it may have in the economic, military and environmental paradigms. In the current international system, an issue in one particular geography is almost always an area of transnational concern, with a potential of metamorphosing into an international security issue. If the case in question concerns an area of disputed land (or waters), the ripple effect is assumably felt by all those in the immediate geographic region but also several others who feel the ripples situated far away from the epicentre, through an upset of the global supply chain. China has contested the existing international order as an aspiring superpower, and the Chinese state hasn’t been shy of throwing its weight around.

The states around the South China Sea (SCS) have laid claims over certain regions, and counterclaims by others states have disputed their narratives. This cacophony of claims and counterclaims involves the states of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Brunei Darussalam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, Taiwan/Republic of China (hereon being referred to as the littoral states), and therefore the scale of disputes has been large. Out of these, the PRC has been making advances that are particularly aggressive – staking claim over more than 80% of the area. The area enclosed by the Nine Dash Line (NDL) or the jiuduanxian is a fairly ambiguous demarcation of a region within the SCS and is meant to represent a distinction from international waters. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been instrumental in China’s effort to establish its claim over this region.

Territorial disputes, be it over pieces of land or a particular chunk of the ocean, are not uncommon. Particularly two reasons for the grave nature of the SCS dispute can be identified. The first point of concern stems from the states involved in the matter.  There is an inherent imbalance in the power held by these states, and as a result of this imbalance, we have a bullying problem at our hands. The PRC towers over all the other states in terms of their military might and diplomatic legitimacy. And it uses this power to delay the resolution of this dispute (Bhatt, 2020). In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled in the favour of the Philippines, dismissing Chinese claims, including the NDL. And yet, the SCS has seen no decline in militarization or intentions of retreating from the side of the PRC (Campbell & Salidjanova, 2016). The Chinese have categorically refused to accept the ruling, and the international system lacks the authority to deploy any punitive measures against the PRC. The world order is no stranger to bullies, but the PRC has relatively recently been added to the list of heavyweights and its presence is making others on that list fairly uncomfortable. While the West is uncomfortable, the rest remain frustrated that no real solutions exist to solve their trouble. The second reason for concern has to do with the value of the region itself. Ticking all boxes of real estate – economic value in the form of lush oil and mineral deposits and rich fishing ground; and geostrategic significance as an important Sea Line of Communication (SLOC) placed in the Pacific Ocean. Particularly for the Chinese, it would (a) allow them to move towards energy sufficiency and reduce their dependency on oil imports; (b) maintain dominance over trade routes going through South East Asia and (c) counter the expanding threat of American presence in its extended maritime regions (Bhatt, 2020).

The security problem here – very simply put – is a matter of territorial sovereignty. China’s blatant territorial expansion poses a threat to all other states in the region. As mentioned earlier, the disputes are not only with China but also among the littoral states. Several islands have also been claimed by multiple littoral states. But the PRC’s moves in the area are very much an act of aggression and highly problematic. The PLAN has kept others in the region at bay and has been monitored by watchful eyes across the Pacific. US interest has been on account of its own national security, which I do not intend to list as another security concern, simply because the replacement of one dominating actor with another would do nothing for the littoral states, whom I identify as referent objects in this case.

Another pressing concern is the absence of a means for security. To invoke a realist notion – the anarchic international order saves no room for a legitimate force of authority. In the SCS, the littoral states cannot hope to contest the PRC on their own through military or diplomatic means. US sanctions that were imposed on Chinese companies on account of their role in the advancement of claims in the South China Sea (CNN, 2022) hardly made an impact. A sanction of a greater scale would be too costly, given that US stakes in the region aren’t as direct and have thus far not been deemed threatening enough by Uncle Sam to be the cause of another trade war. The declaration of the arbitral tribunal ruling as “null and void” by the Chinese and the subsequent maintenance of the status quo also eliminates the possibility of international judicial bodies serving as a means of amelioration. Enforcement of international laws on a state like the PRC becomes too expensive for the international system. This raises questions on the efficacy of international law as a tool for security and makes one fearful for the future of such disputes. Will this be a precedent for years to come, a reminder that some states can wrestle their way into a particular territory without facing the wrath of war and braving but a mere economic sanction?

 

References

Bhatt, Pooja. 2020. Nine Dash Line: Deciphering the South China Sea Conundrum. New Delhi: KW Publishers Pvt Ltd.

Campbell, C., & Salidjanova, N. (2016). South China Sea Arbitration Ruling: What Happened and What’s Next?. US-China Economic and Security Review Commission.

CNN. (2022). US sanctions 24 Chinese companies over South China Sea island building. CNN. Retrieved 14 February 2022, from https://edition.cnn.com/2020/08/27/asia/us-sanction-south-china-sea-intl-hnk/index.html.