A Nuclear Iran through the eyes of a Realist, Liberal and Constructivist

 

If you asked me “What is theory?”, I’d probably say, “I think of it as a way to look at the world. Different theories look at the world through different lenses.” Or at least that’s what I remember learning in the INT 101 course in my first semester in college. Realism, liberalism and constructivism where the first theories I was taught and although I can’t claim to understand them perfectly, I do think I’ve come a long way since back then. I will now try and explain the issue of a nuclear Iran through the lenses of these theories. Before that, here’s a brief history of the issue. Iran’s first nuclear reactor began operations in 1967 under the West-friendly rule of the Shah of Iran. The overthrow of his regime in 1979 signalled the beginning of Iran’s anti-West phase, including the quest for nuclear weapons. The West responded with sanctions that crippled the Iranian economy for years. Finally in 2015, Iran would conclude an agreement with the Permanent 5 countries of the UNSC, Germany and the EU which involved it limiting its nuclear programme to civilian use and opening it to external inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in return for the lifting of nuclear weapons-related sanctions. However, in 2018, the USA under the Donal Trump regime pulled out of the deal.

Conventional ideas of realism see it as a fundamentally pessimistic theory with rational states as the main actors. It explains most things by using the concept of the anarchic international system or the lack of an authority to supervise all states. Because they have no one to go to if they need help, states are always suspicious of each other. Since the revolution in 1979, Iran has had sour relations with the US-led West and finds itself with powerful adversaries (Saudi Arabia and Israel) and few allies in its neighbourhood. Realists would say that Iran therefore desires nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence- the sheer destruction nuclear weapons can bring about is such a threat that few would seek to antagonise it. Iran’s identity and ideology would not matter much to most realists, and neither would those of its rivals. Some realists, such as Kenneth Waltz, even believe it would be in the interests of stability if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons in a region where the only existing nuclear power is Israel because they believe a single nuclear power could be a source of instability. The US’s disapproval of Iran’s nuclear programme is explained by realists who see it as a challenge to a status quo that favours the US. Realists would say that Iran acquiring nuclear weapons would threaten its position in the region severely, which would explain the US going as far as signing an agreement with Iran to prevent it from acquiring weapons.

Liberals also believe that the international system is anarchic and dominated by states. But they’re more optimistic than realists. They believe that because states are rational actors, they’ll see more merit in working together instead of against each other to secure the best interests of the individual. Thus, states can “tame” anarchy and move in a progressive direction, with the product being a loosely rules-based system characterised by liberal democracies. One could go as far as arguing that the Iran Nuclear Deal was almost a product of the liberal internationalist project. It involved states overcoming their animosity towards each other to secure the individual and in the process, move the world further towards peace. This is also a reflection of the faith liberals place in international institutions evinced by the importance given to the IAEA. Liberalism may explain the US’s withdrawal of the deal by linking it with developments in the domestic sphere as they think of the state as a transmission belt for the citizens of a country to express their interests on the international stage. The election of Donald Trump to the presidency in 2016, with a campaign involving pulling out of the deal, was a clear indicator of where the US stood. So, while liberalism might disapprove of the act of pulling out of the deal, it can certainly make sense of it.

Constructivism has always been the toughest of the three theories to understand for me but at the same time, the most fascinating. Constructivism’s idea of anarchy is probably best summed up by Alexander Wendt’s famous quote, “Anarchy is what states make of it.” A state’s identity and therefore what it perceives as a threat is also not fixed. Rather, the identity is inter-subjectively constructed by different actors who collectively decide to see something a particular way. Constructivism could come up with several reasons the US saw Iran is a threat starting. It could be historical in how a US-friendly regime was thrown out during the revolution, the nature of the Iranian rhetoric or political system or who Iran allies with (or a combination of these). States create a stable identity for themselves through the stylised repetition of acts. The Iranian state, in its earlier quest for nuclear weapons, may have chosen to articulate anti-Western rhetoric as a way of securing its own identity and using a heavily Islamic form of nationalism to gain legitimacy. I feel the US’s pursuit of the nuclear deal may also be explained as the US’s own pursuit of a certain seemingly benevolent identity. Under President Obama, the US government had tried to forge a more peaceful, less interventionist identity, with the president promising to pull American troops out of Iraq and initiate the withdrawal from Afghanistan. This identity contrasted with his predecessor President Bush’s highly interventionist foreign policy. While the Obama administration did get tangled in new conflicts in other parts of the world, I believe that constructivists might see the nuclear deal as an attempt to cast the US as a benevolent power at least through discourse. Iran might also have chosen to agree to the deal to secure a new identity for itself, stable and free from Western sanctions. Similarly, the Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from the deal could be seen as an attempt by it to construct an assertive US identity.   

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