A Three-eyed view of the Russia-Ukraine War

 

Since this a very short piece, I will not be talking about the background of the war and the major geographical areas, or key developments that have taken place during its timespan. I will instead be focusing on analyzing different aspects of the war using the International Relations theories of Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism. I will try and use the three theories to provide reasoning to why the war occurred and what were its main contributing factors.

The Russo-Ukrainian war started with the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. It was followed by the war in Donbas, which still goes on to some extent. Since late 2021, Russia started mobilizing large number of troops near the Ukrainian border and finally invaded on the 24^th of February. Two months later now, Ukraine has been impressive at not only holding off the Russian army, but also at gaining advantage in some areas. This is an extremely simplified account of the much-complicated war, but we will go ahead with this for the sake of brevity.  

The Russia-Ukraine War

According to realist scholars, the international order and institutions that function under it, will be realist if the world system is either bipolar or multipolar.[1] The reason being, if there are two or more superpowers in the world, they are bound to engage in security competition. In the perspective of the Russo-Ukraine war, Realism helps us focus on the security and power relations dynamic between the two countries. The first explanation is that it was a natural reaction to NATO’s expansion into the EU and the former Soviet Union. It is evident that Russia considers these countries as its sphere of influence. NATO, and the USA’s attempts at converting former Soviet nations into liberal democracies and integrating them into the liberal internationalist order were seen as acts of provocation by Russia. Mearsheimer also agrees that the West should not have tried to include Ukraine in NATO.[2] It was made evident by Russia that NATO forces on its border will be intolerable and unacceptable.  Bringing in Waltz’s idea of relative gains, NATO and the West were gaining a clear advantage vis-à-vis Russian security, which saw it as an existential threat and acted with the motive of self-interest. In the Realist view, Russia as a great power did what it was compelled to do.

Liberals on the other hand have an optimistic view of international relation. Unlike Realism, where security competition and conflicts are bound to arise, scholars of liberalism believe that the world order can be improved peacefully with the spread of democracy, trade, and cooperation through international organizations. According to liberals, the international order will be inherently peaceful because democracies are extremely unlikely to go to war with one another (democratic peace theory). In the case of the Russo-Ukraine war, liberals inherently have a problem with the domestic system of the state as it is not a democracy. And since authoritarian states are much more likely to wage wars, it is the inability of the USA to spread democracy and integrate Russia into the liberal international order.

Only the topmost few have control over Russian domestic and international decision-making. And since minority-rule results in a war, it is Russia’s governing structure that is at fault. Furthermore, spread of democratic ideals on Russia’s borders in the form of a NATO-member Ukraine, poses a serious threat to oligarchs and their ruling authority. The Liberal perspective also blames the West for not adhering to its commitment to dialogue, communication, and for not understanding Russia’s perspective of a former major power. After Russia's economic crisis in 1992, it distanced from Europe. Liberalism in IR would propose that, if the west had tried to work with Russia after the Soviet Union fell apart, if they had tried to broaden Russia's interests and universalize them with those of the west, Russia would have felt less threatened by NATO expansion in Europe due to the understanding and cooperation between the two. Ikenberry[3] writes about the flaws in the Liberal international model and explains why it is bound to fail. Having faith in international institutions, trade, and dialogue, instead of underestimating Russian reaction to a NATO-member Ukraine gives us a liberal idea as to why the war occurred.

    

Liberalism, as understood by many economists and Mearsheimer as well.

To briefly talk about the ontological security perspective[4], Russia had formed a consistent identity of a state that opposes NATO expansion, democratic ideals, and has a antagonistic relationship with the USA. When all three of the above occurred right at its border, Russia behaved according to its routine-justified identity and attacked Ukraine.

Constructivism focuses on the domestic society within the nation state and engages in a bottom-up method of building an identity of the nation. It is the domestic ideas, norms, beliefs, and the community’s history that come together to define the nation. The constructivist debate hinges upon the fact that all meaning-making and all the ways through which we comprehend reality, are socially constructed. Hopf[5] gives a comprehensive account of the different forms of constructivist thoughts. To some extent, it supports the liberalist debate about Russia’s identity as an authoritarian regime and how the people of Russia see the nation and its actions as legitimate. As Wendt says, identities are the basis of interests, and in this case, Russian interest is in conforming to its socially constructed sense of self. The widespread notion that Crimea belongs to Russia also played a huge part in starting the war. There are large groups in Russia, especially retired soldiers that harbor thoughts like “Russia without Ukraine is a nation, but Russia with Ukraine is an Empire”. Such thoughts combined with the former identity of Russia as a great power have also played a part in starting and legitimizing the war in Russia.

Therefore, the war may not completely be the fault of Russian aggression but also of the West’s questionable decisions. In this blog, I emphasized on the Russian side of thinking and contemplation as there are numerous sources and voices that speak about the supposedly legitimate actions and decisions of the West.

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[1] John J. Mearsheimer; Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order. International Security 2019; 43 (4): 7–50. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00342

[2] Mearsheimer , John J. “John Mearsheimer on Why the West Is Principally Responsible for the Ukrainian Crisis.” The Economist, The Economist Newspaper, 19 Mar. 2022, https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2022/03/11/john-mearsheimer-on-why-the-west-is-principally-responsible-for-the-ukrainian-crisis.

[3] Ikenberry, John, “The end of liberal international order?”, International Affairs, Volume 94, Issue 1, January 2018, Pages 7–23, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix241

[4] Mitzen, Jennifer. “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma.” European Journal of International Relations, vol. 12, no. 3, Sept. 2006, pp. 341–370, doi:10.1177/1354066106067346.

[5] Hopf, Ted. “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory.” International Security, vol. 23, no. 1, 1998, pp. 171–200, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539267. Accessed 1 May 2022.