Human Rights, Yemen, and Theoretical Fissures

 Human Rights, Yemen, and Theoretical Fissures 

Bayan lives with her father and brother in a camp for internally displaced people in Mokha. Photo: WFP/Hebatallah Munassar


Human rights are inalienable, or so they say. The gross violation of human rights in Yemen seems to go against the very phrase itself. In continuation to my last blog, I would like to give recent updates on the already worsened crisis and the deteriorating situation in Yemen. David Gressly, the Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen addressed the problem as ‘getting worse and must be addressed immediately'. 


Nearly three-quarters of Yemen's population is in quest of aid. This represents a rise of over three million people from the year 2021 forward. Last year's escalation of violence resulted in untold misery and greater interruption of public services which increased humanitarian needs. Another result of the seven-year war is a crumbling economy which is expected to lead to a record 19 million people needing food aid in the second half of 2022. More than two million children are acutely malnourished as most of them are severely underfed. Women and children continue to suffer cruelly and their health continues to deteriorate due to the lack of access to essential services.

The Human Rights of Yemenis are under constant threat. The coalition commanded by Saudi Arabia and Houthi troops continue their merciless strikes that kill and injure civilians by destroying and damaging civilian items including food delivery facilities. All parties to the conflict continue to detain, forcibly imprison, and torture victims based on their political, religious, or professional affiliations, peaceful activism, gender, etc. 

Yemen is a small country that can't use human rights as part of its foreign strategy, so it doesn't talk about personal human rights much. It only appears to care about human rights if a big country tells it to, which it would fight as hard as possible. Constructivist theories, on the other hand, say that when there are a lot of global political events that can't be explained by realist theories, new models with a higher level of understanding are needed to explain global political development. A constructivist focus on norms and non-state actors might be useful, but it frequently only conveys part of the picture, failing to account for the state's intentional interests in the implementation and development of human rights norms, regardless of non-state pressure or larger normative shifts.

As Hans Peter Schmitz puts it, "In the case of Yemen, this constructivist framework would look for domestic actors to connect to international networks to pressure the Yemeni state to conform to the human rights regime. The change would be impelled by the principled ideals of these domestic groups and their network of international partners.

Realists simply do not have a clear explanation for the rights regime's tangible presence; their model did not anticipate its development or growing significance. A constructivist focus on standards and non-state actors might be useful, but it frequently fails to account for state interests in the implementation and development of human rights norms, independent of the non-state influence or wider ethical shifts. An applied constructivist perspective, on the other hand, recognizes human rights' normative power.

 Andrew Moravcsik points out that constructivist representations of human rights "explicitly distance themselves from explanations that rely on instrumental calculations about the establishment of legitimate domestic governance."

A constructivist emphasis on non-governmental organizations as "the basic driving force" underlying human rights is a welcome corrective to long-dominant frameworks that neglected non-state actors. However, it is overly apolitical in its refusal to adequately question the state and its self-interested power calculations in embracing rights. This conception would pay attention to the identifiable impact of ideas, norms, and nonstate actors on international relations while avoiding an overly idealistic view of global politics by separating the particular interests at stake in the creation and expansion of the rights regime from their own excesses and the destabilizing effects of other states' excesses.

Recognizing rights as a politically powerful normative framework, as well as paying attention to the effects of non-state actors in making rights an aspect of global politics, does not preclude simultaneously acknowledging calculations of hard-boiled government interests, which have always been at the core of human rights development. Non-state players are significant, but they should not overshadow the continuous importance of state actors in these processes. What counts is that they are conversing with others, rather than favoring another, as a realist would advocate. While barely dominating power in a global world crossed by normative, institutional, and political ties, the state remains a source of power and, indeed, the focal point of the international human rights regime. The best approach to shifting beyond competing for constructivist and liberal perspectives is recognizing how both norms and self-interest, and both states and non-state actors, are essential to comprehend human rights integration into international affairs and its extension into the domestic frameworks of a country like Yemen, that is not blessed with a government overly inclined toward human rights and continues to have a mixed human rights record.

The extension of the rights regime to countries where human rights are not normatively dominant or where major powers are not exerting pressure to have rights enforced. This cannot be justified by either global norms that are negligible in the perspective of many peripheral governments like Yemen, or major power pressure and sanctions that are rarely targeted on the premises of humanitarian concerns.

While constructivism provides a far more comprehensive theoretical description of patterns of continuity and change in international politics, it has overemphasized some previously ignored aspects of international relations in its applied versions. Focusing too much on transnational networks and non-state actors as a source of domestic change, risks overlooking the state self-interest that has fueled the evolution of the international human rights regime. It's critical to acknowledge non-state actors' agency, whether domestic or transnational and their impact on short- and long-term normative shifts as well as their focus on the state and state actors.

References-
1. Chase, A. T. (2003). The State and Human Rights: Governance and Sustainable Human Development in Yemen. International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 17(2), 213–236. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20007676
2. Moravcsik, A. (2000). The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe. International Organization, 54(2), 217-252. doi:10.1162/002081800551163

Comments

  1. This is a very well-structured blog, Srishti. This has deeply raised concern and curiosity in my mind about the situation currently prevailing in Yemen. You have connected it with all three theories of Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism very effectively by using Andrew Moravcsik's example made it even clearer for me to understand the constructivist side of it. I agree when you mentioned a small country that is barely making its ends meet and facing the largest humanitarian crisis care about its individual fundamental rights unless told by a greater power/nation.

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